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4Foreword
The exponential growth in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), biometrics, 
big data and predictive analytics in market capitalism will undoubtedly 
further shift the relationship between businesses and consumers.
Foreword
The 2019 Financial Cost of Fraud report is 
published at a time of increasing political and 
economic unpredictability. Across the globe 
economies and businesses are facing a myriad 
of new challenges and opportunities. These are 
largely being driven by the emergence of new 
technologies which are fundamentally altering 
the ways in which our political systems, global 
markets and human beings are behaving. 
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While these new technologies offer 
forward-thinking organisations almost 
untold opportunity to capitalise on 
this changing behaviour, they also 
unfortunately offer those who would 
use this technology for more nefarious 
purposes similar opportunities. Indeed, 
in the 10 years since this report was 
first published, the one constant has 
been that fraudsters continue to exploit 
new technology to undermine and 
target businesses and individuals for 
personal and sometimes political gain. 
Fraud is often described by those in 
the industry as an ‘arms race’. In the 
last 15 to 20 years, an armoury of tools 
has become available for businesses to 
combat fraud, but, as these defences 
have been strengthened, so too have 
the techniques used by fraudsters 
been correspondingly refined. 
Keeping track of these changing 
threats is a particularly onerous 
problem for business leaders. Not 
only are new threats emerging 
at increasing speed, but, under 
pressure to manage costs, it is 
often hard to justify expenditure 
on technology which may very well 
be obsolete in just a few years.
While awareness among business 
leaders of the threat of fraud has 
undoubtedly improved during the 
lifespan of The Financial Cost 
of Fraud reports, their approach 
for the most part has sadly not. 
Generally business leaders continue 
to adopt a reactive approach; 
a case of hoping that it doesn’t 
happen and, if it does, managing 
the impacts after losses and often 
reputational damage has occurred. 
One of the key issues that is 
constantly faced, is calculating 
the value and ascribing a suitable 
proportion of a budget to combat it. 
This difficulty is one of the reasons 
why The Financial Cost of Fraud 
was developed and continues to be 
invaluable to organisations in helping 
them assess the threat of fraud. 
It shows that the financial cost of 
fraud can be accurately measured 
in the same way as other business 
costs and that it is not unnecessarily 
expensive or difficult to manage. 
Most importantly, it shows what 
the financial cost is likely to be.
No doubt in the next 10 years we will 
see new threats and opportunities 
emerge. Hopefully, through the findings 
of this and future reports, organisations 
will be in a far better position to 
anticipate them, fully armed with the 
knowledge needed to tackle the size 
and scale of the problem. 
 
 
Jim Gee, Partner and National Head 
of Forensic Services, Crowe UK
Visiting Professor and Chair of the 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 
University of Portsmouth
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6.05%
Global losses of 
fraud equate to 
6.05% of GDP.
-40%
Reducing such losses 
by 40% would free  
up more than  
£76 billion  
each year. 
£3.89  
trillion
This equates to 
USD 5.127 trillion, 
or £3.89 trillion.
UK
For the UK, fraud 
losses equate to  
£130 billion* 
each year.
80%
Global fraud losses  
are 80% larger than  
the UK’s entire  
GDP.
* Focused, sector by sector research makes this total even larger at nearer £190 billion.
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10%
An average organisation 
should expect losses 
owing to fraud to account 
for between 3%–6%, 
although in some cases 
is as high as 10%.
In 2018
From an average 
of 4.57% to 
7.15% in 2018.
+57%
This sum is 57% 
greater than the 
UK Government 
spent on defence 
in 2018/19.
80%
Since 
2009
Since 2009, losses 
owing to fraud have 
risen by 56.5%.
1  Introduction
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1.1 This report renews research 
first undertaken in 2009, 2011, 
2013, 2015, 2017 and 2018 
collating accurate, statistically 
valid information from around 
the world about the real financial 
cost of fraud and error. Once the 
extent of fraud losses is known 
then they can be treated like 
any other business cost – as 
something to be managed and 
minimised in the best interest of 
the financial health and stability 
of the organisation concerned. 
It becomes possible to go 
beyond reacting to unforeseen 
individual instances of fraud 
and to embed strategies to 
pre-empt and minimise fraud 
losses in business plans.
1.2 The report doesn’t look at 
detected fraud or the individual 
cases which have come to 
light and been prosecuted. 
Because there is no crime which 
has a 100% detection rate, 
adding together detected fraud 
significantly underestimates 
the problem. If detected fraud 
losses go up, does that mean 
that there is more fraud or that 
there has been better detection? 
Equally, if detected fraud losses 
fall, does that mean that there is 
less fraud or worse detection?
1.3 The report also does not rely on 
survey-based information where 
those involved are asked for their 
opinions about the level of fraud. 
These tend to vary significantly 
according to the perceived 
seriousness of the problem at 
the time by those surveyed. 
While such surveys sometimes 
represent a valid survey of 
opinion, that is very different 
from a valid estimate of losses.
1.4 Instead, this report considers 
and analyses 690 exercises 
which have been undertaken 
around the world during more 
than 20 years, to accurately 
measure the financial cost 
resulting from fraud and error. 
1.5 That financial cost is surely the 
worst aspect of the problem.  
Yes, fraud is unethical, immoral 
and unlawful. Yes, the individuals 
who are proven to have been 
involved should be punished. 
Yes, the sums lost to fraud need 
to be traced and recovered. 
However, these are actions 
which take place after the fraud 
losses have happened – after 
the resources have been 
diverted from where they were 
intended and after the economic 
damage has occurred. 
1.6 In almost every other area of 
business life, organisations 
know what their costs are – 
staffing, accommodation, utility, 
procurement to name but a few. 
For centuries, these costs have 
been assessed and reviewed and 
measures have been developed 
to reduce them and improve 
efficiency. This incremental 
process now often delivers quite 
small additional improvements.
1  Introduction
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 1.7 Fraud and error costs, on the 
other hand, have only had the 
same focus over the last 15–20 
years. The common position 
has been that organisations 
have either denied that they 
had any fraud or planned 
only to react after fraud has 
taken place. Because of this, 
fraud is now one of the great 
unreduced business costs.
1.9 Because it is now possible to 
measure fraud and error losses, 
proper judgements can be 
taken about a proportionate 
level of investment to be 
made in reducing them. 
Re-measurement can then 
assess the financial benefits 
resulting from their reduction.
1.10 Making organisations more 
efficient and reducing costs is 
an ever-present task. Fraud is 
an ‘unnecessary’ cost because 
much of it can be pre-empted. 
This report identifies what the 
financial cost of fraud and error 
has been found to be and thus 
the ‘size of the prize’ to be 
achieved from reducing that cost.
1.11 Of course, there is always more 
research to be done and any 
organisation should consider 
what its own fraud and error 
costs are likely to be. However, 
the volume of data which is 
already available from exercises 
covering total expenditure of 
over £19.02 trillion points clearly 
to losses usually being found in 
the range of 3–10%. This is likely 
around the average of 6.05% 
and possibly much higher.
1.12 We will continue to monitor 
data as it becomes 
available and publish further 
reports as appropriate.
2  Overview
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2.1 Our research has now reviewed 
690 loss measurement 
exercises undertaken over the 
period from 1997 to 2018. The 
exercises took place across 40 
different types of expenditure 
in 49 organisations from 10 
countries considering losses in 
expenditure with a total value of 
£19.02 trillion. The value  
of the expenditure examined has  
not been uprated to 2018 values. 
The losses referred to are a 
percentage loss of expenditure.
2.2 This report is based on extensive 
global research, building on 
previously established direct 
knowledge, to collate information 
about relevant exercises. 
The data was then analysed 
electronically. Exercises were 
collated from Europe, North 
America, Australasia and Africa.  
None were found in Asia. 
2.3 The report has excluded 
guesstimates, figures derived 
from detected fraud losses, and 
figures resulting from surveys 
of opinion. It has also excluded 
some loss measurement 
exercises where it is clear 
that they have not met the 
standards described below.
2.4 It has included exercises which:
• have considered a  
statistically valid sample  
of income or expenditure
• have sought and examined 
information indicating the 
presence of fraud, error 
or correctness in each 
case within that sample
• have been completed 
and reported
• have been externally validated
• have a measurable level 
of statistical confidence
• have a measurable 
level of accuracy.
2  Overview
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2.5 There are a number of caveats.
2.6 Some of the exercises have 
resulted in estimates of 
the fraud frequency rate, 
some of the percentage of 
expenditure lost to fraud, and 
some have measured both.
2.7 It is also the case that some 
exercises have separately 
identified and measured fraud 
and error, and some have not. 
2.8 Once such exercises have been 
completed the organisations 
concerned have decided, on 
occasion and mistakenly in 
our view, not to publish their 
results. Transparency about 
the scale of the problem is a 
key factor in its solution. Only 
then can attention be focussed 
and a proportionate investment 
made to address the issue.
2.9 In some cases, those directly 
involved in countering fraud have 
confidentially decided to provide 
information about unpublished 
exercises for wider consideration. 
In those cases, while the overall 
figures have been included in the 
findings of this report, no specific 
reference has been made to 
the organisations concerned.
2.10 We are also aware of a very 
small number of other exercises 
which have been completed, 
but which have not been 
published and where nothing 
is known of the findings. 
2.11 Finally, it is important to 
emphasise that this research 
will never be complete. More 
evidence becomes available 
each year. However, the 
preponderance of the evidence 
does point clearly in one 
direction, as is explained later.
2.12 While it is necessary to make 
these caveats clear, the 
importance of the evidence 
collated in this report should  
not be underestimated.  
It shows that losses to fraud 
and error represent a significant, 
damaging and, crucially, 
unnecessary business cost. 
3  Data from around the world
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3  Data from around the world
The 10 countries in which the authors are aware that 
fraud loss analysis exercises have taken place are:
3.2 By value of income or expenditure 
measured, the US has undertaken 
the greatest amount of work in this 
area. This is a direct reflection of the 
Improper Payments Information Act of 
2002 (IPIA), which requires designated 
major US public authorities to estimate 
the annual amount of payments made 
where fraud and error are present,  
and to report the estimates to the 
President and Congress with a 
progress report on actions to reduce 
them. The Improper Payments 
Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 
further strengthened this requirement. 
Canada
United States 
of America
United 
Kingdom
Zambia
Ireland
Australia
New Zealand
The Netherlands
France
Belgium
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3.5 In the UK, the government is on 
record as requiring this work to  
be undertaken. Indeed in late 2014, 
the government’s Cabinet Office 
Fraud Error and Debt Taskforce, 
with the agreement of Ministers, 
asked all government departments 
to undertake ‘random sampling’ 
loss measurement exercises, 
and this work has proceeded 
rapidly since then. This is a major 
step forward to countering fraud 
in UK central government. 
3.6 These developments are part of a 
consistent trend. Over the period 
between 1997 and 2017 – the growth 
in the number of loss measurement 
exercises was marked, with a 
tenfold increase in prevalence.
3.7 In 2018 this trend continued with 
a further 57 loss measurement 
exercises (where the results have 
been made known) being completed.
3.3 The guidance relating to the 
original IPIA stated ‘The estimates 
shall be based on the equivalent 
of a statistical random sample with 
a precision requiring a sample of 
sufficient size to yield an estimate 
with a 90% confidence interval 
of plus or minus 2.5%’.1 This 
remains the case although many 
US agencies undertake work to 
the higher standard often found 
in the UK and Europe – 95% 
statistical confidence and +/– 1%.
3.4 In other countries, while 
there has not been any legal 
requirement to date, there is 
a growing understanding that 
the key to successful loss 
reduction is to understand the 
nature and scale of the problem. 
For example, in Europe, the 
European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Declaration, agreed by 
organisations from 28 countries 
called for ’the development of a 
European common standard of 
risk measurement, with annual 
statistically valid follow up 
exercises to measure progress 
in reducing losses to fraud and 
corruption throughout the EU’.2 
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4 Types of income and expenditure 
and the nature of the figures
4.2 The key figures which have 
been produced concern the 
percentage loss rate (PLR –  
i.e. the proportion of expenditure 
lost to fraud and error).
4.3 There is more research still 
to be done and it is intended 
that this report will be 
updated on a regular basis.
Payroll Housing EducationProcurement
Insurance Tax creditsSocial securityHealthcare Pensions
Construction CompensationAgricultureMining
The types of income and expenditure where 
losses have been measured include:
5  Fraud and error losses
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5.1 The range of percentage losses 
across all the exercises reviewed 
between 1997 and 2018 was 
found to be between 0.02% 
and 31.53%,3 with average 
losses of 6.05% (67.7% of 
the exercises showed loss 
figures of more than 3%).
     43.92%
Percentage lost 3–8%
43.92%
     23.81%
Percentage lost >8%
23.81%
     32.28%
Percentage lost <3%
32.28%
5 Fraud and error losses
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
1997–2007
A
ve
ra
ge
 %
 lo
st
 
2017–2018
5.00%
6.00%
7.00%
8.00%
7.15%
4.57%
5.2 Since the start of the global 
recession in 2008, there has 
been an increase in average 
losses from 4.57% to 7.15%  
for the period 2017–2018 –  
an increase of 56.5%. 
An area of expenditure in the US 
Department of Veterans Affairs
56.5% 
growth
3
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5.3 The reasons for these 
increases – whether over the 
last two years or over the longer 
period since 2007 – seem 
to go beyond the economic 
cycle. Previous research has 
suggested some evidence 
that certain frauds increase 
during recessions and plateau 
or decrease slightly during 
periods of economic growth. 
5.4 This does not explain why the 
cost of fraud has continued to 
increase since economies have 
returned to growth. Further 
research will be needed but it 
may be that longer term social 
and technological factors are an 
underlying cause of the growth 
of fraud, in addition to the 
effect of the economic cycle.4
5.5 Such factors might include:
• greater individualisation 
(less belief that we should 
all be bound by common 
moral and ethical ‘norms’)
• greater complexity of 
processes and systems  
(it is becoming easier to  
disguise fraud amidst this 
complexity, which, itself  
is harder to understand)
• most transactions are 
now being undertaken by 
computer’s with fewer face to 
face transactions (fraudsters 
feeling more distant from the 
victims of their dishonesty 
and thus less concerned 
about any response)
• a perception that many 
societal ‘role models’ 
(be they members of 
parliament, senior executives 
or other public figures) 
are dishonest weakening 
the anti-fraud culture
• the increasing pace of change 
in business (with controls 
struggling to keep up). 
5.6 The evidence demonstrates 
that organisations which have 
undertaken repeated exercises 
to measure losses in the 
same areas of expenditure 
have reduced the losses 
over time. This suggests that 
organisations that know the 
extent of their fraud losses are 
better at reducing the losses.
5.7 The global average loss rate for 
the entire period of the research 
(6.05%), when taken as a 
proportion of the global Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) for  
2018 ($84.74 trillion or  
£64.42 trillion),5 equates to  
£3.89 trillion ($5.127 trillion),  
a sum more than 80% greater 
than the UK’s entire GDP. Even 
reducing such losses by 40%, 
which individual organisations 
have achieved, would free up 
more than £1.55 trillion – a sum 
greater than the GDP of 174 
countries, including Spain, 
Australia and Mexico.
Gill, M. (2011) Fraud and Recessions:  
Views from Fraudsters and Fraud Managers. 
International Journal of Law, Crime and 
Justice, 39, 204–214.
4
International Monetary Fund figures.5
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5.8 In the UK, applying that global 
average loss rate to GDP 6  
would imply total losses of  
£130 billion each year (although 
more detailed UK – focused, 
sector by sector research makes 
this total even larger at nearer  
£190 billion)7. Reducing such 
losses by 40% would free  
up more than £76 billion  
each year. This sum is 
57% greater than the UK 
government spent on defence 
(£48.3 billion8) in 2018/19.
5.9 On the basis of the evidence, 
it is clear that fraud and error 
losses in any organisation should 
currently be expected to be at 
least 3%, probably almost 6% 
and possibly more than 10%.  
It would be wrong to go too  
much further in terms of 
predicting where in this range 
losses for an individual 
organisation will be, without 
some organisation – specific 
information about the strength 
of arrangements to protect it 
against fraud (its ‘fraud resilience’).
5.10 Crowe UK (Crowe) and the Centre 
for Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS),  
in parallel research, have developed 
Europe’s most comprehensive 
database of fraud resilience 
information, with data recorded 
concerning more than 1,300 
organisations from almost every 
economic sector. By combining  
the data which underpins 
this report and organisation 
specific information about 
fraud resilience, Crowe and 
CCFS are able to predict:
The related cost 
of making those 
improvements
The likely scale 
of losses
The key improvements 
which reduce them 
5.11 Crowe and CCFS can also 
accurately measure losses or 
train client organisations to do 
so. The practical experience of 
Crowe specialists, combined 
with the academic rigour of 
CCFS researchers, provides an 
unparalleled expert resource.
International Monetary Fund figures  
estimate UK GDP for 2018 to be  
$2.829 trillion or £2.15 trillion. 
 
Annual Fraud Indicator 2017. 
 
https://www.ukpublicspending.co.uk/
uk_national_education_analysis
6
7
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6  Conclusion and recommendations
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6.1 This is the seventh report since 
2009 in an area where, for too 
long, the accurate measurement 
of losses was considered either 
impossible or too difficult. It no 
longer is. In many areas loss 
measurement has become 
routine. Losses to fraud and 
error can now be treated as a 
business cost like any other –  
to be measured, managed  
and minimised.
6 Conclusion and recommendations
6.3 Where losses have been 
measured, and the organisations 
concerned have accurate 
information about their 
nature and extent, there are 
examples, especially in the 
UK and US where losses have 
been substantially reduced. 
Some of the best examples 
within the 20 year plus period 
covered by this report include:
• a major mining company 
which reduced losses 
across its procurement 
expenditure by over 51% 
over a two year period 
• the UK’s National Health 
Service (the second largest 
organisation in the world) 
between 1999 and 2006 
where losses were reduced 
by up to 60%, and by up to 
40% over a shorter period 
• the US Department of 
Education, which reduced its 
losses across a $12 billion 
grant program by 35% 
between 2001 and 2005 
6.2 It is also the case that work  
to measure losses is highly  
cost-effective. Efforts to  
reduce losses are helped by 
greater knowledge about the 
scale of the problem.  
 
The data shows that organisations 
which re-measure the same 
area of expenditure have 
consistently lower loss rates. 
• the US Department of 
Agriculture, which reduced 
its losses across a $12 
billion program by 28% 
between 2002 and 2004 
• the UK’s Department of 
Work and Pensions which 
successfully reduced 
its losses in Income 
Support and Job Seekers 
Allowance by 50% between 
1997/98 and 2005/06 
• the US Department for 
Veterans Affairs which 
successfully reduced its 
losses across a $4 billion 
program by more than 
46% in 2010 and 2011 
• the US Department 
of Agriculture (again) 
successfully reduced its 
losses across an $8 billion 
program by more than 22% 
• the UK’s Department of Work 
and Pensions (again) achieved 
a significant reduction of more 
than 24% in losses in respect 
of Job Seekers Allowance.
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6.4 Even during the two years after 
the start of the recession in 
2008, when losses generally 
were increasing rapidly, two of 
the organisations included in our 
research reported very significant 
reductions in their losses – one 
by 33% and the other by 19% – 
within a single year in each case.
6.5 Three things are clear.
6.6 In any economic climate, not to consider the 
financial benefits of making relatively painless 
reductions in losses to fraud and error is foolhardy. 
Doing so can mean more money for better public 
services, more profitable companies and charities 
better able to fulfil their charitable purposes.
3
Losses can be significantly reduced 
when accurate information about their 
nature and extent is available.
Losses to fraud and error can be 
measured – and cost effectively.
On the basis of the evidence it is likely that 
losses in any organisation and any area of 
expenditure will be at least 3%, probably 
near to 6% and possibly more than 10%
22
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8  Crowe UK’s Forensic Services and the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
Crowe’s Forensic Services are 
designed to help clients whatever the 
problem, wherever the place. We help 
clients to react to an adverse event or 
to better protect themselves against 
such events in the future. We have 
delivered such services across most 
continents, and in some of the most 
difficult countries in which to operate. 
Our aim is to deliver significant 
financial benefits for clients 
which far exceed our fees. 
Crowe’s team are specialists with a 
high-level national and international 
track record built up over many 
years. We have advised clients of all 
different types and sizes, including 
governments, major national and 
international companies and high 
profile charities. Our people hold 
professional qualifications and have 
many years of practical experience. 
We adopt a business approach to 
fraud, cyber and forensic issues, 
making sure your organisation is  
as financially healthy and stable  
as possible, for now and the future. 
8 Crowe UK’s Forensic Services and 
the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
We offer a full range 
of forensic services 
• Fraud investigations.
• Forensic accounting.
• Financial crime.
• Cybercrime protection. 
• Whistleblowing.
• Corporate intelligence. 
• Counter fraud advisory. 
• Training and mentoring. 
For more on Crowe UK visit:
www.crowe.co.uk 
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For more on CCFS visit:
www.port.ac.uk/ 
centre–for–counter–fraud–studies 
The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies, 
University of Portsmouth
The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies 
(CCFS) is one of the specialist  
research centres of the Institute of 
Criminal Justice Studies, formed in  
2009 to accommodate the growing 
interest in counter fraud that has 
occurred within the Institute over the  
last 10 years. 
The Centre aims to collate and present 
the widest possible range of information 
regarding fraud and the solutions applied 
to it, and to undertake and publish further 
research where needed. Additionally, 
the Centre’s Fraud and Corruption Hub 
gathers the latest thinking, publications, 
news and research in one central 
resource for counter fraud professionals.
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